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 I investigate the impact of different price limits regime on the overreaction 
hypothesis. 
 I find evidence of the overreaction hypothesis in the Egyptian stock exchange. 
 Price reversal pattern is observed 1-3 days post limit hits.  
 The results support the directional effect and the magnitude effect hypotheses. 
 The volatility spillover hypothesis is a possible interpretation to the results. 
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The Influence of Price Limits on Overreaction in Emerging 
Markets: Evidence from the Egyptian Stock Market 
 
Hisham Farag 
Birmingham Business School 
 
Abstract 
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the influence of price limits on the 
overreaction hypothesis in the Egyptian stock market (EGX) during the period 1999-2010. I 
find evidence of the overreaction anomaly in the EGX within different price limit regimes. 
Price reversal is observed two and three days post lower and upper limit hits respectively 
within the strict price limits regime. However, it occurs after one day only for both lower and 
upper limit hits within the circuit breakers regime. These results support the the directional 
effect hypothesis as large stock price movements are followed by price reversals in the 
opposite direction. Moreover, the results support the the magnitude effect hypothesis as the 
larger the initial price movements the greater the subsequent reversals. 
 
  JEL classification number: G14 
Key words: overreaction hypothesis, price reversal, emerging markets. 
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1. Introduction 
Price limits are regulatory tools in both equity and futures markets in which further trading is 
prevented for a period of time with the intention of cooling market traders’ emotions and 
reducing price volatility. The trigger for such limits is when prices hit particular pre-specified 
price boundaries
1
. Price limits have become very popular and are widely used by different 
stock exchanges over the world; however, their rules vary amongst the world’s stock 
exchanges. There are two other categories of these regulatory tools, namely, firm-specific 
trading halts and circuit breakers (Kim and Yang, 2004 and Phylaktis et al., 1999). With firm-
specific trading halts, trading is ceased for a given period of time within the session, or until 
the end of the trading session, for a particular stock(s) if prices hit the predetermined limit
2
.  
 
On the other hand, circuit breakers are regulatory tools that combine firm specific trading 
halts with price limits to cool down market volatility. Within the circuit breakers regime, 
trading also may be stopped - for a pre-specified duration – across the whole market if the 
market index hits a pre-determined level. The NYSE experience demonstrates that this is the 
most popular market-wide circuit breaker (Lee et al., 1994).  
 
In efficient markets investors usually react to new information arriving in the market as a 
result of which, stock prices reach their equilibrium levels instantly. However, in less 
efficient markets i.e. emerging markets, information does not get disseminated to all investors 
at the same time. Therefore, when new information arrives in the market, investors tend to 
overreact or underreact; share prices then move (up or down) towards their equilibrium levels 
(Fama,1989). 
 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) were the first to empirically examine the overreaction hypothesis 
in the finance literature. They built on the reasoning of Dreman (1982) and discovered a new 
stock market anomaly based on the Tversky and Kahneman’s representativeness theory 
                                                          
1 Price limits were first implemented in the Japanese rice futures market (the Dojima exchange) in the 
eighteenth century (see Chung and Gan, 2005). In 1917, price limits on cotton futures contracts were used in the 
US. The Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) adopted this regulatory tool in 1925 (Kim and Yang, 2004). 
2 The history of the firm-specific trading halts started in 1934 when the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) was granted the power to suspend trading on particular shares in the organised market (Kim and Yang, 
2004).  The most popular example of firm-specific trading halts is that which operated in the NYSE where there 
are two main types of trading halts, namely, news and order imbalance trading halts (Kim and Yang, 2004 ; 
Chan et al., 2005). The former comes into operation when the regulator expects that disseminated news will 
have an impact on prices, whereas the latter comes into operation when there are large discrepancies between 
buy and sell orders (Kim and Yang, 2004). 
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(1974). De Bondt and Thaler (1985) concluded that the market prices are predictable and 
deviate from their fundamental due to investors’ overreactive behaviour and this suggests a 
clear violation of the Weak Form market efficiency. 
 
 De Bondt and Thaler (1985) formulate two main testable hypotheses; the first hypothesis, 
“large stock price movements will be followed by price reversals in the opposite direction” 
(the directional effect of Brown and Harlow, 1988) and the second hypothesis, “the larger the 
initial price movements the greater the subsequent reversals” (the magnitude effect). This 
means that stock returns exhibit negative serial correlation over the longer horizon and 
therefore investors may earn abnormal returns by exploiting this long-term mispricing. This 
suggests a clear violation of market efficiency
3
.  
 
Imposing price limits on this theory may prevent speculative traders from overreacting to the 
information, and allows more time for investors to analyze this new information and to adjust 
their portfolios, particularly during the trading halt period until the trading session is 
resumed. Therefore price limits– in theory –should cool down market sentiment and reduce 
stock price volatility (Phylaktis et al., 1999; Chen, 1997; Kim and Rhee, 1997 and Chan et 
al., 2005).  
 
Despite the popularity of price limits, there is a remarkable debate in the literature regarding 
the effectiveness of such regulatory tools, and whether or not they actually reduce price 
volatility as intended (Phylaktis et al., 1999). Price limits may cause price volatility to spread 
out over a few days post limit hits (volatility spillover hypothesis); see for example, Fama 
(1989); Kim and Rhee (1997); Chen (1997); George and Hwang (1995) and Chen et al. 
(2005). Moreover, it is argued that price limits prevent security prices from reaching their 
equilibrium levels due to the suspension of trading for a period of time (delayed price 
discovery hypothesis); see for example Fama (1989); Lehmann (1989); Lee et al. (1994); 
Kim and Rhee (1997); and Phylaktis et al. (1999).  
 
                                                          
3 De Bondt and Thaler (1985) find that past Losers outperform past Winners by 24.6% in the US, and therefore 
they recommend selling Winners short and buying Losers as a profitable strategy. They argue that the 
overreaction phenomenon causes past Losers to be underpriced and past Winners to be overpriced. In addition, 
they find evidence that the overreaction effect is asymmetric and most of the cumulative average abnormal 
residuals (16.6%) are realised in January.  
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Lee, et al. (1994) argue that price limits interfere with the price discovery mechanism as 
trading usually ceases (when prices hit the limit) until the limits are revised. Therefore, at the 
limit-hit day these constraints i.e. limits prevent stock prices from reaching their equilibrium 
levels until the following trading day (session). Therefore, if price limits are activated, stocks 
often experience either price continuation or price reversal as the equilibrium price may fall 
inside or outside the daily limit range (Fama, 1989 and Phylaktis et al., 1999).   
 
Although there has been extensive literature on price limits, no other studies - to the best of 
my knowledge- have empirically investigated the influence of imposing alternative price 
limit regimes (circuit breakers/price limits) on the overreaction hypothesis. There are a few 
stock exchanges throughout the world that have imposed alternative price limits regimes and 
switched to wider limit bands e.g. Thailand from 10% to 30%, and the Korean Stock 
Exchange from 6% to 15%. However, the Egyptian stock exchange uniquely provides an 
example of the switch from strict (narrow) price limits (SPL) (+/-5%) to circuit breakers 
(CB). The switch is accompanied by a move to much wider price limits (+/-10% - 20%). 
Therefore, studying the Egyptian experience may add to the literature on price limits.  
 
This paper– to the best of my knowledge – is the first to investigate the effect of imposing 
different regulatory regimes on the overreaction hypothesis. I find evidence of the 
overreaction anomaly in the EGX.  Price reversal is observed two and three days post lower 
and upper limit hits respectively within the SPL regime. However, price reversal occurs after 
one day only within the CB regime. These results support the the directional effect hypothesis 
of Brown and Harlow (1988); as large stock price movements are followed by price reversals 
in the opposite direction. Moreover, the results support the the magnitude effect hypothesis as 
the larger the initial price movements the greater the subsequent reversals.  
 
This paper provides clear evidence of stock market imperfection; therefore investors can earn 
abnormal returns by exploiting the overreaction anomaly. Exploring market imperfections 
works as an early warning system to the regulator in emerging markets. The rest of the paper 
is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a survey of the literature. Section 3 provides a 
brief description of the dataset and presents details of the econometric modeling. Section 4 
reports the empirical results, and a final section summarizes and concludes. 
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2. Literature review 
2.1 Price Limits 
Huang et al. (2001) investigate the overreaction hypothesis in the Taiwanese stock market 
over the period 1990-1996. They find evidence to support the overreaction hypothesis as 
price continuation pattern is found in the overnight period following limit moves and price 
reversal behavior is reported in the subsequent trading days due to noise trading. Phylaktis et 
al. (1999) also find empirical evidence to support the overreaction hypothesis in the Athens 
stock exchange over the period 1990 to 1996. 
 
 Kim and Yang (2008) also investigate the information and the overreaction hypotheses in the 
Taiwanese Stock Exchange (TWSE). They find a dramatic decrease in price volatility 
following consecutive limit hits. Moreover, they find that price limits are unable to reduce 
information asymmetry in the TWSE. Kim and Rhee (1997) find evidence of price 
continuation as trading activity was found to increase following the limit-hit day(s). Bildik 
and Gulay (2006) use the methodology of Kim and Rhee (1997) and find evidence for the 
trading interference hypotheses in Istanbul stock market over the period 1998–2002.    
 
Huang (1998) analyses the overreaction hypothesis following up and down limit moves for 
all the listed shares in the Taiwan stock exchange during the period 1971-1993. He finds 
highly significant price reversals following up and down limit moves; these reversals are not 
due to size effects. Diacogiannis et al. (2005) using the methodology of Huang (1998), find 
similar results in the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). Chen et al. (2004) investigate the 
learning behaviour of rational investors and the role of past information within the strict (7%) 
price limits regime in Taiwan over the period 1991-1998. They find evidence of 
underreaction behaviour due to the delayed information hypothesis within the price limits 
regime.  
 
Kim and Limpaphayom (2000) look at the characteristics of shares that frequently hit the 
limits in Taiwan and Thailand stock exchanges over 1990-1993. They find that high volatility 
and trading volume are the main characteristics of shares that are likely to hit the limits. Chan 
et al. (2005) investigate the effect of imposing wider price limits (+/- 30%) on the price 
discovery mechanism, information asymmetry and order imbalance in the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange (KLSE) over the period 1995- 1996. They find no evidence that price limit 
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enhances information asymmetry. They also find that price limits delay the information flow 
and lead to order imbalance. Kim (2001) finds similar results on the Taiwanese Stock 
Exchange and argues that the more the restricted bands of price limits the higher the volatility 
of stock returns. Nath (2005) investigates the effect of price limits on different groups of 
stocks listed in the National Stock Exchange (NSE) in India over the period 1999-2000. He 
concludes that price limits are found to be a useful tool in captivating volatility for some 
individual shares but not for the entire Indian stock market.  
 
2.2 Firm-Specific Trading Halts 
Greenwald and Stein (1991) argue that trading halts provide a suitable time for the 
dissemination of information between brokers and traders, so that large price movements are 
expected post trading halts. Greenwald and Stein (1988) claim that large price movements are 
not a cause for concern as long as there is no information asymmetry between the traders and 
specialists. Kyle (1988) argues that trading halts reduce price volatility and cool the markets 
down as they allow investors to adjust their portfolios or to cancel their orders. Therefore – 
from the perspective of regulators – trading halts may protect investors from incurring heavy 
losses. Madura et al., (2006) investigate the consequences of trading halts in the NASDAQ in 
1998. They find significant abnormal returns pre trading halts period in the NASDAQ, 
however, they find no significant abnormal returns post trading halts.  
 
On the other hand, Fama (1989) argues that trading halts historically failed to cool markets 
down and decrease price volatility. In contrast, volatility is found to be higher under such 
halts (Lee, et al., 1994)
4
. Fama (1989) believes that all investors may implement their own 
trading halts if they wish to analyse the disseminated information; these are called 
“homemade’’ trading halts. Kim and Yang (2004) argue that trading halts may imply welfare 
loss for traders as they are unable to trade during the halts. Christie et al. (2002) investigate 
the relationship between trading halts and the dissemination of information during the halts in 
the NASDAQ
5
 over the period 1997- 1998. They find that liquidity can be enhanced during 
the market closure as trading halts allow the dissemination of information and enable 
investors to adjust their portfolios. They also find highly significant increases in trading 
                                                          
4
 They argue that the media coverage plays an important role in explaining the post halt price behavior due to 
the increase in the heterogeneity of investors’ beliefs. 
5
 In the NASDAQ there are two types of price discovery mechanisms associated with trading halts. One is the 
five-minute quotation period pre the resumption of trading. The second type is if a trading halt occurs after 4 
pm. In this case, trading will reopen the following day (trading session) with 90 minutes trading quotation.  
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volume and stock price volatility during the 90 minutes quotation period in the following day 
(trading session). 
 
Kim et al. (2008) find that both trading volume and volatility increase immediately after 
trading halts in the Spanish stock exchange over the period 1998-2001. However, liquidity 
tends to be higher within a trading halts regime compared to strict price limits. They argue 
that investors are willing to provide liquidity as the degree of information asymmetry is 
reduced by the release of the new information during the trading halts. Kryzanowski and 
Nemiroff (1998) examine whether the relationship between price discovery and trading halts 
are stable over time during the period 1988-1989. They find that both volatility and trading 
volume tend to increase significantly around trading halts over two days subsequent to 
trading halts.  
 
3. Institutional background about EGX 
The Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX) achieved reasonable performance indicators during the 
financial crisis period
6
. The Economist classified the EGX in 2010 as one of the best six 
emerging markets (CIVETS)
7
 offering significant potential growth. Moreover, the World 
Federation of Exchanges’ (WFE) statistics in 2010 reported that the average gain achieved by 
EGX was 15%, ahead of many leading world emerging stock exchanges i.e. China, Brazil, 
and the Czech Republic. Whereas, Standard and Poor’s S&P IFCI reported that the average 
growth rate for the EGX during 2010 was 13% in US$ compared with an average growth rate 
of 12% for other emerging markets.  
 
EGX regulator has imposed two different price limits regimes namely strict price limits (SPL 
and circuit breakers (CB). Since 1996, strict (+-5%) price limits (SPL) were imposed to all 
the listed shares. The limit is activated for a particular stock only when stock prices hit the 
upper or lower limit, and then the trading on these shares is suspended to the end of the 
trading session. In 2002, the regulator adopted the CB regime in which price limits have 
winded to +-20% for the most actively traded shares in the EGX. Within the new CB regime, 
when a particular stock price hits +-10%, trading is halted for 30 minutes. During the halt 
period, brokers should inform their clients about the temporary suspension of the trading 
                                                          
6 Some institutional factors distinguish the Egyptian stock market from other emerging markets such as neither 
capital gain nor dividends are taxed. 
7
 Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa 
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session. Moreover, they are allowed to cancel or adjust traders’ positions. Trading is ceased 
until the end of the session only when prices hit their ceiling of +/- 20%.  
 
4. Data and Econometrics Modeling  
Daily stock price and market capitalization were collected for all listed companies8 in the 
EGX over the period 1999-2010. I use the EGX30 - a free-float market capitalization-
weighted index as a benchmark. Table 1 summarizes the frequency of limit hit events over 
the period 1999-2010. 
Table 1: Summary statistics for the frequency of events 1999-2010 
year 
Upper limit 
 Hits 
Lower limit  
Hits 
Total 
no. of 
events +5% +10% -5% -10% 
Total no. of events 5511 775 5571 525 1225 
1999 551 0 15 0 244 
2000 570 0 41 0 264 
2001 571 0 551 0 289 
2002 517 14 527 51 346 
2003 541 21 514 19 376 
2004 208 30 143 22 403 
2005 283 42 221 33 579 
2006 164 117 152 83 516 
2007 38 106 35 96 275 
2008 15 531 24 501 302 
2009 21 541 25 511 300 
2010 18 159 17 132 326 
 
 
To investigate the overreaction hypothesis under price limits and/or circuit breakers, I adopt 
the event study methodology of Brown and Warner (1980) and Huang (1998)
9
. The return 
variable is defined as the first difference in the natural logarithm of the closing price 
(adjusted for dividends, stock split and stock dividends) over two consecutive trading days. I 
estimate the market model parameters i and i  over estimation window 125 days (-140,-
16) as in equation 2. Other measures are also tried, namely the CAPM model and market 
adjusted model, but qualitatively the results remain the same. This is also in line with the 
literature (Cox and Peterson, 1994).  
                                                          
8 The number of listed companies varies over time and ranges from 180-251. 
9
I also used the Event Study methodology of Bremer and Sweeney (1991) and Cox and Peterson (1994), to 
estimate the abnormal returns using different estimation and test windows and obtained similar results. 
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I define the event (t=0) as when stock prices hit the upper or the lower limit in both regimes 
(SPL +/-5%) and (CB +-10%)
10
. The Egyptian stock market is a thinly trading market so that 
to avoid the infrequent trading bias following Huang (1998), I exclude those shares that are 
not traded at least 80% of trading days during the estimation window. Stocks’ abnormal 
returns in the test period are defined as follows:  
 
    
TtRR mtiiit .....,2,1,0,                                                               (1)
 
 
Following Huang (1998), the event window is -15, +15 and the security abnormal return in 
the post-event period has been estimated as in equation 2: 
 
 TtRRAR mtiiitit .....,2,1,0,             (2) 
 
Where T = 31 days around event window (-15, +15), i  and i  are the parameters of the 
market model for each company over the estimation window. I also use GARCH and 
TARCH models to estimate security abnormal returns following Benou and Richie (2003) 
and obtained similar results to those of OLS. itR and mtR  
are the returns on company (i) and 
the value weighted market index EGX30 respectively. 
 
The daily average abnormal return (AAR) for a given day for (n) events and the cumulative 
average abnormal returns for the event window (-15, +15) are calculated as in equations 3 
and 4 following Huang (1998). 
 
             



t
iit AR
n
AAR
1
1

                                                                              (3) 
             


t
iit ARCAR
1
                                                                                (4) 
 
To further develop the analysis, I examine the effect of firm size on the overreaction 
hypothesis following Huang (1998). Market capitalization (as a proxy for size) is calculated 
for each share based on the average daily market capitalization in the previous month (t-1). 
                                                          
10
 I have also used symmetric windows (symmetric number of years within each regime) and obtained very 
similar results. 
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Firms included in the sample are ranked in ascending order and grouped into five quintiles 
based on market capitalization of the previous month. This process is updated according to 
the monthly market capitalization rankings of the companies included in a sample. Daily 
average abnormal returns have been calculated for two groups, namely, Small and Big based 
on the first and fifth quintile.    
   
Finally, following Cox and Petersen (1994); Larson and Madura (2003); Farag and Cressy 
(2010) and Ma et al. (2005), I estimate equation 5 for both upper and lower limits 
individually by regressing non-overlapping cumulative average abnormal returns 
iCAAR  
against initial abnormal returns in event day
i0AAR , firm size (natural log of the free float 
market capitalization one day before the event), and a dummy variable representing the 
regime in operation (SPL or CB). Moreover, I include iLeak variable (cumulative average 
abnormal returns for three days before the event date) that captures the leakage of 
information and the effect of insider information as a proxy for market inefficiency (Larson 
and Madura 2003). I also control for the effect of the global financial crisis by including a 
dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the event occurs during 2007 -2010 and 0 
otherwise. 
 
iiii GFCSPLCAAR   4i3i2i01 Leaklnmcap  AAR            (5)  
 
Where iCAAR  is the cumulative average abnormal returns for company (i) over the event 
window (140 days). 
0iAAR is average initial abnormal return for company (i) in event day t = 
0. 
imcapln  is the natural log of the free floated market cap of company (i) one day before the 
event. iLeak  is the cumulative average abnormal returns for three days before event date as a 
proxy for the leakage of information.
iSPL is a dummy variable = 1 if the strict price limits 
regime is in operation and 0 otherwise. GFC is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the event occurs during 2007 -2010 and 0 otherwise.
i is a white noise error term for stock 
(i). 
 
 
 
5.  Empirical results 
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6.1 Descriptive statistics and diagnostic tests. 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the empirical analysis 
and the diagnostics tests for the EGX30 index and two subsamples namely SPL and CB 
respectively. The results presented in Table 2 show that the average returns (Rmt) for the 
EGX30 index is positive 0.05%. The cumulative average abnormal return (CAARit) is 2.37% 
over the event window (31 days), however, the average abnormal return (AARit) is 0.115%. 
The initial one-day abnormal return on event day (ARi0) ranges from -8.64% to 11.32 % over 
the event window with mean and standard deviation 0.548% and 8.89% respectively. The 
cumulative average abnormal returns three days before the event (Leakit) - as a proxy for the 
leakage of information - is 7.02 %, with 7.37% standard deviation over the event window. 
Finally, the average firm size is proxied by market capitalization of 202.4 million Egyptian 
pounds.  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics and the diagnostics tests for daily stock returns in EGX 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Max Min Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Rmt 0.05 8.612 -10.54 1.812 -0.671 9.05 
CAARit 2.373 3.804 0.107 1.342 -0.423 1.501 
ARit 0.115 0.548 -0.259 0.173 0.335 3.009 
AARi0 0.548 11.328 -8.636 8.891 0.214 1.521 
Lnmcap 19.121 1.461 24.831 18.516 0.111 2.342 
Leakit 7.019 16.081 -1.298 7.376 0.153 1.743 
Panel B:  Diagnostic Tests 
 ADF KPSS PP Q(20) Q2(20) LM ARCH 
Rmt -45.051
***
  0.327 38.32
***
 177.17
***
 681.81
***
 150.78
***
 
RmtSPL  -24.469
***
  0.214 -28.25
***
 128.13
***
 414.00
***
 191.41
***
 
RmtCB 23.031
***
 0.142 22.97
***
 74.42
***
 201.21
***
 26.98
***
 
The Table reports the descriptive statistics for the EGX30 market index and the main variables used in 
the empirical analysis. Rmt is the daily return on the EGX30 market index; CAARit: is the cumulative 
average abnormal returns over 31 day window; AARit: is the average abnormal returns over 31 day 
window; ARi0: is the abnormal return on event day; Lnmcap: is the natural log of the free floated market 
cap of company (i) one day before the event. Leakit: is cumulative average abnormal returns for three 
days before event date as a proxy for the leakage of information. Table 2 also presents the tests for serial 
correlation (Box and Pierce), ARCH effects (Ljung-Box and Lagrange Multiplier), stationary 
(Augmented Dickey Fuller or ADF, Phillips- Perrone or PP and Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and 
Shin or KPSS) for the EGX30 market index, SPL, and CB windows. SPL and CB refer to the strict price 
limits and circuit breaker windows respectively ***, **,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels.  
 
Panel B presents the diagnostic tests for the market return (Rmt) for the EGX30, SPL and CB 
windows respectively. The 20Q  Box and Pierce test for serial correlation on the first 20 lags 
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of standardized residuals reject the null that stock returns are serially uncorrelated. The 
Ljung-Box and LMARCH tests reject the null that there is no ARCH effect. The KPSS test 
for stationarity with lag length determined by the Newey-West bandwidth test) does not 
reject the null that stock returns are stationary. The ADF and PP tests with lag length 
determined by Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) reject the null hypothesis that stock 
returns are nonstationary.  
 
6.2 The Overreaction Hypothesis 
Table 3 presents the average abnormal returns and the cumulative average abnormal returns 
for the upper and lower SPL (+-5%). Table 3 shows that the average abnormal returns for the 
upper limits on event day is positive (3.95%) and highly significant, meanwhile the average 
abnormal returns for the lower limits on event day is negative (4.45%) and highly significant 
as well. Price reversals occur on the third day subsequent to upper limit hits (t=-1.93) and on 
the second day for the lower limit hits (t=1.68). A possible explanation for this phenomenon 
is the delayed price discovery. According to the delayed price discovery hypothesis, strict 
price limits delay or prevent stock prices from reaching their equilibrium levels for a few 
days post event as trading is suspended until the end of trading session when prices hit the 
limits. Therefore, the effect of the limit hit continues in the following day(s) subsequent to up 
and down limit activation.  
 
Moreover, we notice the leakage of information effect one day pre the upper event (AR= + 
0.28% and marginally significant). This suggests that upper limit hits might be predictable 
one day pre the event. As for the lower limit hits, Table 3 reports significant and positive 
abnormal returns five days pre the event. This suggests that the lower limit hits may not be 
predictable under the SPL regime. The positive and significant abnormal returns five days pre 
event may imply investor optimism and herding behavior
11
.  
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Average abnormal returns for upper and lower limit hits within the Strict 
Price Limits regime 
 Upper limit hits Lower limit hits 
Days +5% -5% 
                                                          
11
 If there is a leakage of information effect we would expect negative and significant abnormal returns pre 
event. 
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AR(%) CAR(%) t(AR) t(CAR) AR(%) CAR(%) t(AR) t(CAR) 
-15 -0.1337 -0.1337 -0.7053 -0.7053 -0.1466 -0.1466 -0.7416 -0.7416 
-14 0.4708 0.3371 2.3759** 1.1345 0.0436 -0.1030 0.2238 -0.3215 
-13 -0.0091 0.3280 -0.0476 0.9721 0.0247 -0.0783 0.1620 -0.2275 
-12 -0.0403 0.2877 -0.2522 0.6879 0.1019 0.0236 0.5391 0.0626 
-11 -0.2779 0.0098 -1.5355 0.0199 0.1778 0.2014 1.0985 0.4825 
-10 0.4274 0.4371 2.0443** 0.7266 0.2186 0.4200 1.1556 0.8003 
-9 0.3331 0.7702 2.0270** 1.1084 0.1235 0.5435 0.6470 0.9827 
-8 -0.1745 0.5957 -1.0198 0.7933 0.4712 1.0147 2.5957*** 1.5929 
-7 0.2254 0.8212 0.9448 1.0718 0.1224 1.1371 0.7364 1.6877* 
-6 0.1820 1.0031 0.8574 1.1912 0.1869 1.3240 0.9184 1.7804 
-5 0.1699 1.1730 0.6652 1.2834 0.3655 1.6895 1.6938* 2.0334** 
-4 0.1105 1.2835 0.5700 1.3923 0.4626 2.1521 2.0669** 2.4037** 
-3 0.1105 1.3941 0.5700 1.2337 0.4626 2.6147 2.0669** 2.4243** 
-2 -0.1225 1.2716 -0.4642 0.9835 0.5427 3.1574 2.3646** 2.6531*** 
-1 0.2801 1.5517 1.8423* 1.7903* 0.1087 3.2661 2.4301** 2.4896** 
0 3.9534 5.5051 16.0287*** 4.2220*** -4.4529 -1.1868 -26.737*** -2.7332*** 
1 0.1362 5.6413 0.3454 4.052*** -0.3606 -1.5474 -0.5246 -0.7338 
2 0.6337 6.275 1.7307* 3.3583*** 0.1696 -1.3778 1.6839* -0.8564 
3 -0.2785 5.9965 -1.9321* 3.4481*** 0.5106 -0.8672 0.7667 -0.5402 
4 0.4493 6.4458 1.3325 3.6264*** 0.8104 -0.0568 1.7195* -0.0612 
5 0.4683 6.9141 1.7822* 3.718*** -0.4758 -0.5326 -2.0772** -0.2555 
6 0.0938 7.0079 0.315 3.619*** -0.014 -0.5466 -0.0754 -0.2593 
7 -0.2552 6.7527 -0.9973 3.326*** 0.7228 0.1762 1.1274 0.1783 
8 0.1858 6.9385 0.7209 3.3392*** -0.1532 0.023 -0.8588 0.0934 
9 0.1855 7.124 0.7789 3.3875*** -0.2755 -0.2525 -1.252 -0.0574 
10 0.1091 7.2331 0.318 3.2987*** -0.4219 -0.6744 -2.0937** -0.2886 
11 0.0062 7.2393 0.0217 3.2778*** 0.1079 -0.5665 0.5671 -0.2285 
12 0.4204 7.6597 1.7641* 3.4827*** -0.0441 -0.6106 -0.2445 -0.2573 
13 0.2426 7.9023 0.8959 3.5581*** -0.2921 -0.9027 -1.3307 -0.4106 
14 0.3764 8.2787 1.4538 3.5337*** 0.0475 -0.8552 0.2305 -0.3778 
15 0.551 8.8297 2.5838*** 3.6886*** -0.2898 -1.145 -1.3161 -0.5264 
The Table presents the average abnormal returns and the cumulative average abnormal returns for the Strict Price 
Limits (SPL) upper and lower limit hits (+-5%). ***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
  
 
Table 4 presents the average abnormal returns and the cumulative average abnormal returns 
for the CB regime. Table 4 shows that the average abnormal returns for the upper and lower 
limits on event day are +11.32% and -8.63% respectively and both are highly significant. 
Price reversal occurs on day one following the upper and lower limit hits (t=-1.92 and 2.99 
respectively); however, the latter is highly significant. We also notice the leakage of 
information effect for the upper limit hits, as the abnormal returns on day one pre-event are 
highly significant, (positive abnormal returns are found four days pre-event). This suggests 
that upper limit hits might be predictable one day pre the event within the CB regime. As for 
the lower limit hits, Table 4 reports positive but insignificant abnormal returns six days pre 
the event, which suggests that lower limits might not be predictable under the CB regime. 
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This might be due the discrepancy in news dissemination speed in case of good (upper limits) 
and bad news (lower limits).  
 
Table 4: ARs and CARS for Upper and Lower limit hits within the CB regime 
 Upper limit hits Lower limit hits 
Days 
+10% -10% 
AR(%) CAR(%) t(AR) t(CAR) AR(%) CAR(%) t(AR) t(CAR) 
-15 -0.0352 -0.0352 -0.1146 -0.1146 0.7467 0.7467 1.9948** 1.9948** 
-14 -0.1875 -0.2227 -0.7146 -0.8474 1.2343 1.9810 3.8296*** 4.2844*** 
-13 -0.7487 -0.9714 -2.4672** -1.3135 0.2616 2.2426 0.6871 3.3353*** 
-12 -0.0655 -1.0369 -0.2752 -1.2489 0.0250 2.2676 0.0923 3.2370*** 
-11 -0.5312 -1.5681 -1.7723* -1.5640 0.6578 2.9254 1.5807 2.7832*** 
-10 -0.3646 -1.9327 -1.1692 -1.6915* 0.5777 3.5031 1.3842 2.3340*** 
-9 0.4298 -1.5029 1.5179 -1.0597 0.4586 3.9617 1.2985 2.6023*** 
-8 0.0697 -1.4332 0.3258 -1.1228 -0.0195 3.9422 -0.0672 2.4284** 
-7 0.3477 -1.0855 1.0907 -0.6605 -0.4015 3.5407 -1.3467 2.0850** 
-6 -0.1090 -1.1945 -0.4382 -0.4560 0.0780 3.6187 0.2473 2.0273** 
-5 -0.1169 -1.3114 -0.3555 -0.3608 0.7022 4.3209 2.0623 1.9820** 
-4 0.3177 -0.9937 0.9916 0.2769 0.4225 4.7434 1.1711 2.0687** 
-3 0.3177 -0.676 0.9916 0.5384 0.4225 5.1659 1.1711 2.2486** 
-2 0.0627 -0.6133 0.1490 0.9301 0.1050 5.2709 0.2430 2.5619** 
-1 0.6043 -0.009 1.9668** 1.1639 0.3731 5.644 1.0595 2.6258*** 
0 11.3280 11.319 30.6179*** 7.3844*** -8.6362 -2.9922 -21.384*** -2.9432*** 
1 -0.5768 10.7422 -1.9159* 7.0178*** 1.6122 -1.38 2.9928*** -1.9197* 
2 -0.1945 10.5477 -0.3465 6.2229*** -0.6983 -2.0783 -1.9257* -1.0556 
3 0.6262 11.1739 1.4070 6.0432*** -0.0692 -2.1475 -0.1643 -1.1549 
4 -0.0290 11.1449 -0.0701 5.7334*** -0.9047 -3.0522 -1.3984 -1.4125 
5 0.0026 11.1475 0.0053 5.1626*** 0.6204 -2.4318 1.0971 -0.6703 
6 -0.1624 10.9851 -0.3823 5.0544*** 0.0002 -2.4316 0.0007 -0.4215 
7 0.2800 11.2651 0.5203 4.6873*** -0.5460 -2.9776 -1.7603* -0.7332 
8 0.2905 11.5556 0.6901 4.6616*** -1.3613 -4.3389 -1.7523* -1.1866 
9 1.0686 12.6242 1.9663** 4.5480*** -0.4132 -4.7521 -0.6104 -1.2211 
10 -0.2191 12.4051 -0.5495 4.3324*** 0.0724 -4.6797 0.1247 -1.3032 
11 -0.1317 12.2734 -0.3226 4.1756*** -0.0407 -4.7204 -0.0837 -1.3312 
12 0.1090 12.3824 0.2530 4.7106*** -0.2387 -4.9591 -0.5701 -1.1091 
13 0.2646 12.647 0.6042 4.9524*** -0.2259 -5.685 -0.5191 -1.2902 
14 -0.2947 12.3523 -0.7927 4.7403*** -0.4727 -6.1577 -1.3298 -1.3675 
15 0.0048 12.3571 0.0135 4.7940*** -0.0682 -6.2259 -0.1595 -1.3481 
The Table presents the average abnormal returns and the cumulative average abnormal returns for the +-10% upper 
and lower limit hits. ***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
 
The results presented in Tables 3 and 4 show that the price reversal pattern is observed two 
and three days post lower and upper limit hits respectively within the SPL regime. However, 
the price reversal occurs after one day only for both lower and upper limit hits within the CB 
regime. These results support the the directional effect hypothesis of Brown and Harlow 
(1988); as large stock price movements are followed by price reversals in the opposite 
direction. Moreover, the results support the the magnitude effect hypothesis as the larger the 
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initial price movements the greater the subsequent reversals. I interpret these results in line 
with the delayed price discovery hypotheses. To sum up, the above results support the 
overreaction hypothesis in the EGX. Figure 1 shows the cumulative average abnormal returns 
for the upper and lower limit hits over the event window for the two regimes. 
 
 
Figure 1: Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the upper and lower price 
limit hits over the event window for the two regimes 
 
 
6.2 The quintile size portfolios 
To investigate the effect of firm size on the overreaction hypothesis under different 
regulatory regimes, Table 5 presents the average abnormal returns and the cumulative 
average abnormal returns for the upper SPL for small and big portfolios in Panels A and B 
respectively. The results presented in Panel A show that there is price continuation behavior 
for small portfolios for two days following event day (upper limit hits); however, we notice 
positive and marginally significant abnormal returns one day following the event. Price 
reversals occur on day three post event. These results are consistent with Huang (1998). 
 
The results reported in Panel B show that price reversal for big portfolios occurs on the 
second day following the event. The leakage of information is clear for big portfolios as 
significant and positive cumulative abnormal returns are observed two days pre limit hits. A 
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possible interpretation of this result is that the vast majority of investors are actively involved 
in analyzing the news of big firms.   
 
Table 5: Average abnormal returns for the upper limit hits for Big and Small portfolios 
within SPL regime 
 
Upper limit hits  +5% 
Days 
Panel A: Small portfolios Panel B: Big portfolios 
AR(%) CAR(%) t(AR) t(CAR) AR(%) CAR(%) t(AR) t(CAR) 
-15 -0.3628 -0.3628 -0.9109 -0.9109 0.1285 0.1285 0.4165 0.4165 
-14 1.1477 0.7849 2.6569*** 1.5510 0.3629 0.4914 1.4986 1.8737* 
-13 -0.7191 0.0658 -1.6397* 0.1611 0.2636 0.755 1.4876 2.3366** 
-12 0.5414 0.6072 1.9375* 1.1319 -0.2198 0.5352 -1.0585 1.2286 
-11 -0.7107 -0.1035 -1.4020 -0.1628 0.0365 0.5717 0.1285 1.0401 
-10 0.8820 0.7785 1.9968** 0.9402 0.3271 0.8988 1.0941 1.4539 
-9 0.6619 1.4404 1.7361* 1.3823 0.2668 1.1656 1.0184 1.5516 
-8 -0.2919 1.1485 -0.8285 1.0858 0.1483 1.3139 0.8344 1.5656 
-7 0.2745 1.423 0.4719 1.2900 0.4210 1.7349 1.5200 1.3301 
-6 -0.7047 0.7183 -1.9739** 0.6218 0.0268 1.7617 0.1200 1.3558 
-5 0.1271 0.8454 0.1583 0.4836 0.0858 1.8475 0.2709 2.3573** 
-4 0.2510 1.0964 0.6533 0.5566 -0.1743 1.6732 -0.9536 1.9856** 
-3 0.2510 1.3474 0.6533 0.4151 -0.1743 1.4989 -0.9536 2.2870** 
-2 -0.3751 0.9723 -0.5475 0.2103 0.2724 1.7713 1.9596** 2.0891** 
-1 0.0678 1.0401 0.0978 0.1977 0.3615 2.1328 1.9604** 2.2447** 
0 3.8801 4.9202 6.1000*** 2.9372*** 3.7326 5.8654 13.3678*** 5.3084*** 
1 0.0778 4.998 0.0583* 1.2906 0.1048 5.9702 0.1755 4.434*** 
2 0.7752 5.7732 0.7695 1.0854 -1.2117 4.7585 -2.4622** 3.2049*** 
3 -0.3761 5.3971 -0.4428 1.1963 0.4813 5.2398 0.894 3.7437*** 
4 0.3922 5.7893 0.4325 1.3891 0.2277 5.4675 0.4061 3.3547*** 
5 1.0838 6.8731 1.9944** 1.5849 -0.0854 5.3821 -0.1715 3.1556*** 
6 1.4037 8.2768 2.0287** 1.8153* -0.4670 4.9151 -1.1205 2.7652*** 
7 -0.4326 7.8442 -0.7240 1.6311 -0.5090 4.4061 -1.3056 2.5228** 
8 -0.6800 7.1642 -0.8938 1.5577 -0.2555 4.1506 -0.7500 2.4402** 
9 0.1946 7.3588 0.2943 1.6454* 0.9579 5.1085 2.8107*** 2.7367*** 
10 0.6032 7.962 0.9669 1.8512* 0.3398 5.4483 0.6603 3.0451*** 
11 0.8317 8.7937 1.0101 1.8084* -0.1059 5.3424 -0.2685 3.3089*** 
12 -0.2078 8.5859 -0.3158 1.6886* 0.6081 5.9505 1.7028 3.6141*** 
13 0.9613 9.5472 1.5074 1.8712* -0.0209 5.9296 -0.0863 3.6537*** 
14 0.8263 10.3735 1.5167 1.8924* -0.0017 5.9279 -0.005 3.9516*** 
15 0.6163 10.9898 1.2618 1.9369* 0.3798 6.3077 0.8430 4.2100*** 
The Table presents the average abnormal returns and the cumulative average abnormal returns for the strict 
(+5%) upper limit hits (good news) for Small and Big portfolios in Panels A and B respectively. ***, **,* 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
 
Table 6 presents the average abnormal returns and the cumulative average abnormal returns 
for the lower SPL for small and big portfolios in Panels A and B respectively. The results 
presented in Panel A report that price reversal for small portfolios occurs on the third day 
following the event (lower limit hits) as we also notice positive and highly significant 
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abnormal returns for small portfolios on days three and four post event. However, price 
reversal for big portfolios occurs on the second day following the event. The leakage of 
information is not clear for both small and big portfolios.  
 
Table 6: Average abnormal returns for the lower limit hits for Big and Small portfolios 
within SPL regime 
Lower linit hits  -5% 
Days 
Panel A: Small portfolios Panel B: Big portfolios 
AR(%) CAR(%) t(AR) t(CAR) AR(%) CAR(%) t(AR) t(CAR) 
-15 0.3520 0.3520 0.6964 0.6964 -0.2510 -0.2510 -0.6794 -0.6794 
-14 -0.0243 0.3278 -0.0600 0.4210 0.1595 -0.0915 0.4657 -0.1547 
-13 0.1485 0.4763 0.5712 0.6308 -0.3701 -0.4616 -1.1573 -0.8320 
-12 -0.1330 0.3432 -0.4052 0.3833 -0.0729 -0.5345 -0.1947 -0.6543 
-11 0.1058 0.4491 0.5046 0.4441 0.1909 -0.3436 1.0285 -0.3812 
-10 0.9216 1.3706 2.1811** 1.0331 -0.0899 -0.4335 -0.2389 -0.4252 
-9 -0.2312 1.1394 -0.4048 0.7610 0.2933 -0.1402 1.0392 -0.1205 
-8 0.6140 1.7533 1.1886 0.9167 0.2425 0.1023 0.6663 0.0870 
-7 0.2348 1.9882 0.7034 1.0167 0.0601 0.1624 0.1439 0.1110 
-6 0.1290 2.1172 0.2511 0.9107 -0.1922 -0.0298 -0.5011 -0.0234 
-5 -0.0703 2.0469 -0.1680 0.8068 0.1234 0.0936 0.2269 0.0754 
-4 0.1268 2.1737 0.2704 0.8246 0.4688 0.5624 1.0389 0.4067 
-3 0.1268 2.5031 0.2704 0.8908 0.4688 0.0379 1.0389 0.0257 
-2 0.9282 3.4314 2.0186** 1.0771 0.2310 0.2690 0.3852 0.1848 
-1 0.4986 3.9300 0.9355 1.1235 -0.1157 0.1533 -0.2225 0.0933 
0 -4.3080 -0.3780 -10.2560*** -0.1036 -4.9465 -4.7932 -22.048*** -2.7439*** 
1 -0.7945 -1.1725 -1.6235* -0.3095 -0.7171 -5.5103 1.1773 -2.2732** 
2 -0.9835 -2.1560 -2.2162** -0.5835 0.0376 -5.4727 -0.0614 -2.4389** 
3 2.6901 0.5341 1.9817** 0.2217 -0.5376 -6.0103 -1.3276 -2.8949*** 
4 2.8364 3.3705 1.9825** 0.9592 -0.2411 -6.2514 -0.8844 -2.8865*** 
5 -0.9755 2.3951 -1.9136* 0.7427 0.4912 -5.7602 1.1370 -2.6105*** 
6 0.2461 2.6412 0.6696 0.8276 -0.0559 -5.8161 -0.1248 -2.4556** 
7 2.1338 4.7750 0.8127 0.9084 0.0070 -5.8091 0.0193 -2.5287 
8 -0.2399 4.5351 -0.5887 0.8640 0.1656 -5.6435 0.4210 -2.4596** 
9 -0.8771 3.6580 -1.5489 0.7450 0.0178 -5.6257 0.0500 -2.4672** 
10 -0.4041 3.2539 -0.9203 0.6715 -0.2660 -5.8917 -0.6671 -2.7143*** 
11 0.1545 3.4084 0.4715 0.7001 -0.8966 -6.7883 -2.6559*** -3.5623*** 
12 0.0002 3.4087 0.0005 0.7375 0.3842 -6.4041 0.9133 -2.7968*** 
13 0.3077 3.7164 0.7227 0.7928 -0.0889 -6.493 -0.1721 -2.3969** 
14 0.2926 4.0090 0.5418 0.8557 0.0313 -6.4617 0.0614 -2.4342** 
15 -0.8617 3.1473 -2.5813*** 0.6938 -0.4662 -6.9279 -1.4975 -2.7522*** 
The Table presents the average abnormal returns and the cumulative average abnormal returns for the strict (-
5%) lower limit hits (bad news) for Small and Big portfolios in Panels A and B respectively.***, **,* indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
  
Figure 2 plots the cumulative averages abnormal returns for the upper and lower limits within 
the SPL regime for big and small portfolios. It is clear from Figure 2 that price reversals are 
prevalent for small companies in case of lower SPL regime (-5%). This result supports the 
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small firm effect and can be explained, as volatility is more likely to be higher for small 
companies (Huang, 1998). 
   
Figure 2: Cumulative averages abnormal returns for Big and Small portfolios for the 
upper and lower limit hits within SPL regime 
 
 
Tables 7 and 8 present the average abnormal returns and the cumulative average abnormal 
returns for small and big portfolios within the CB upper and lower limits respectively. We 
notice that price reversals occur one day following the event (limit hits day) for both big and 
small portfolios. Furthermore, the leakage of information is clear for small companies as 
highly significant abnormal return is reported one day pre-event for the upper limits. 
 
The results presented in Tables 7 and 8 do not support the effect of size on the overreaction 
hypothesis within the CB regime as price reversals occur one day following the event. 
Therefore, there is no evidence of the delayed price discovery hypothesis within the CB 
regime; this result is consistent with Kim and Rhee (1997). Figure 3 plots the cumulative 
averages abnormal returns over the event window for the big and small portfolios within the 
CB regime. 
 
 
 
Table 7: Average abnormal returns for the upper limit hits for Big and Small portfolios 
within CB regime 
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Upper limit hits  +10% 
Days 
Panel A: Small portfolios Panel B: Big portfolios 
AR(%) CAR(%) t(AR) t(CAR) AR(%) CAR(%) t(AR) t(CAR) 
-15 0.0230 0.0002 0.0189 0.0189 0.2203 0.2203 0.4366 0.4366 
-14 0.3370 0.0036 0.6734 0.2334 -0.8836 -0.6633 -2.5796*** -0.9326 
-13 -1.6317 -0.0127 -3.9772*** -0.9564 0.3462 -0.3172 0.7803 -0.3943 
-12 0.7860 -0.0049 1.7593* -0.4379 -0.3317 -0.6488 -0.6099 -0.6411 
-11 -1.0335 -0.0152 -2.0605** -1.2686 -0.2290 -0.8779 -0.4606 -0.6437 
-10 0.2641 -0.0126 0.3938 -0.7754 -0.0334 -0.9113 -0.0673 -0.5798 
-9 0.8586 -0.0040 1.9247* -0.2375 0.5631 -0.3482 1.2414 -0.1923 
-8 0.3144 -0.0008 0.6263 -0.0449 0.8693 0.5211 2.4041** 0.2675 
-7 -0.0042 -0.0009 -0.0105 -0.0465 0.1585 0.6796 0.3907 0.3476 
-6 -0.2591 -0.0035 -0.5209 -0.1649 0.3124 0.9920 0.6129 0.4647 
-5 -0.2184 -0.0056 -0.5331 -0.2681 -0.7859 0.2061 -1.1043 0.1105 
-4 -0.8265 -0.0139 -1.2501 -0.5995 1.3715 1.5776 2.2880** 0.7740 
-3 -0.8265 -0.0136 -1.2501 -0.5277 1.3715 2.1136 2.2880** 0.9423 
-2 -0.2851 -0.0164 -0.2861 -0.5202 0.8154 2.9290 1.0346 1.0771 
-1 2.0326 0.0039 2.1044** 0.1159 -1.3659 1.5631 -1.0650 0.4591 
0 11.9821 0.1237 21.1858*** 3.6754*** 10.1940 11.7571 11.2760*** 3.6214*** 
1 -3.9895 0.0838 -4.8058*** 2.3055** -0.9499 10.8072 -0.8447 3.3666*** 
2 0.9464 0.0933 0.6173 2.3764** -0.1755 10.6317 -0.1717 3.0765*** 
3 -0.0105 0.0932 -0.0158 2.4136** -0.3207 10.3111 -0.5933 2.8026*** 
4 0.9056 0.1022 0.7328 2.6762*** -0.2861 10.0250 -0.4533 2.8377*** 
5 3.2954 0.1352 1.8201 2.9140*** 0.1720 10.1969 0.2277 2.7993*** 
6 -1.5100 0.1201 -1.2351 2.4623** 0.4639 10.6608 0.5073 2.6286*** 
7 2.2880 0.1430 0.9667 2.3354** 0.6128 11.2736 0.7652 2.8261*** 
8 -0.3055 0.1399 -0.4681 2.4765** -0.5101 10.7635 -0.7909 2.6929*** 
9 2.8493 0.1684 1.5158 2.3437** -1.1072 9.6564 -1.5432 2.3683** 
10 1.2279 0.1807 1.0446 2.2890** 0.1206 9.7770 0.1915 2.5123** 
11 0.3237 0.1839 0.4907 2.3531** -1.6492 8.1278 -1.8445 1.9064* 
12 -2.2213 0.1617 -1.6006 2.4211** 0.5156 8.6434 0.5108 2.3353** 
13 -0.2452 0.1593 -0.3736 2.2961** -0.1473 8.4960 -0.2412 2.2837** 
14 -0.9861 0.1494 -1.4756 2.2416** -0.8235 7.6725 -1.3231 1.8705* 
15 -0.3968 0.1454 -0.4544 2.3859** -0.3389 7.3336 -0.4192 1.8312* 
The Table presents the average abnormal returns and the cumulative average abnormal returns for Small and 
Big portfolios within the circuit breakers upper (10%) limit hits.***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 21 of 26
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
20 
 
Table 8: Average abnormal returns for the upper and lower limit hits for Big and Small 
portfolios within CB regime 
 
Lower limit hits  -10% 
Days 
Panel A: Small portfolios Panel B: Big portfolios 
AR(%) CAR(%) t(AR) t(CAR) AR(%) CAR(%) t(AR) t(CAR) 
-15 2.3637 2.3637 1.3984 1.3984 0.4387 0.4387 0.8998 0.8998 
-14 0.2721 2.6357 0.4462 1.3198 0.1276 0.5663 0.3126 1.0189 
-13 -0.3024 2.3334 -0.4000 1.3910 0.2504 0.8166 0.3876 0.7924 
-12 -1.0080 1.3254 -1.4911 0.6828 0.8922 1.7089 1.9430* 1.4483 
-11 -0.8538 0.4717 -1.0516 0.2010 0.9058 2.6147 1.8833* 2.1399** 
-10 0.7254 1.1971 0.4910 0.3944 -0.4132 2.2015 -1.5097 1.9101* 
-9 -0.0102 1.1868 -0.0085 0.3256 -0.0339 2.1676 -0.0804 1.9666** 
-8 0.8040 1.9909 0.9015 0.5127 -0.4043 1.7633 -1.5907 1.4895 
-7 0.0789 2.0697 0.0674 0.5385 0.1785 1.9418 0.4517 1.4396 
-6 -0.7880 1.2817 -0.6720 0.3260 -0.6130 1.3288 -1.0243 0.8624 
-5 -0.0874 1.1943 -0.1089 0.2878 -0.4531 0.8757 -1.0928 0.5774 
-4 -0.2045 0.9898 -0.2792 0.2227 -0.0153 0.8604 -0.0280 0.5701 
-3 -0.2045 1.5429 -0.2792 0.3253 -0.0153 0.2956 -0.0280 0.1797 
-2 -1.0182 0.5247 -0.9959 0.1102 -0.9721 -0.6765 -1.4695 -0.3702 
-1 0.5944 1.1191 0.3527 0.2299 1.6311 0.9547 2.7069*** 0.4790 
0 -11.2329 -10.1138 -8.9462*** -2.1427** -7.6231 -6.6684 -6.3750*** -2.8245*** 
1 0.2354 -9.8785 0.2371 -1.8729* 4.4624 -2.2060 3.8610*** -0.7539 
2 1.3024 -8.5761 0.8968 -1.6109 -1.3305 -3.5365 -1.7616* -1.3486 
3 -1.0993 -9.6754 -1.2649 -1.9779** -1.0512 -4.5877 -1.3126 -1.7083* 
4 -1.9053 -11.5808 -1.5797 -2.1336** 0.8758 -3.7119 1.4234 -1.4249 
5 1.0256 -10.5552 1.0104 -2.0436** 1.8371 -1.8748 2.9406*** -0.6304 
6 0.2712 -10.2840 0.3895 -2.1216** -0.1722 -2.0471 -0.4245 -0.7125 
7 0.2394 -10.0446 0.4581 -2.0873** -1.0398 -3.0868 -1.9040* -1.0431 
8 -2.1925 -12.2371 -1.2813 -2.1864** -0.6933 -3.7801 -0.7307 -1.2956 
9 -0.8417 -13.0787 -0.9092 -2.2535** -1.1947 -4.9748 -1.9592** -1.7038* 
10 -1.6071 -14.6859 -1.8575* -2.5001** 0.8214 -4.1534 1.0468 -1.2910 
11 -1.4261 -16.1120 -1.8654* -2.8093*** 0.9363 -3.2171 1.1676 -0.9404 
12 -1.3349 -17.4468 -1.1400 -3.0846*** 1.0451 -2.1720 1.5368 -0.6068 
13 0.6416 -16.8053 0.4889 -2.8946*** 1.0910 -1.0810 1.4690 -0.2913 
14 0.9747 -15.8305 1.2816 -2.6729*** 0.0852 -0.9958 0.1975 -0.2620 
15 -1.0714 -16.9019 -1.2455 -2.7000*** -1.2359 -2.2317 -1.3426 -0.6072 
The Table presents the average abnormal returns and the cumulative average abnormal returns for Small and Big 
portfolios within the circuit breakers lower (-10%) limit hits.***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels.  
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Figure 3: Cumulative averages abnormal returns over the event window for the Big and 
Small portfolios within the CB regime 
 
 
6.3 Cross- sectional regressions 
Table 9 presents the results of the cross sectional (OLS) regression of equation 5. The models 
are well specified (F statistics are highly significant). The R-squared is 32% and 37% for the 
upper and lower limit hits models respectively. Table 9 reports that the SPL dummy is 
negative and significant. This suggests that abnormal returns are less prevalent within the 
SPL regime. The negative sign of lnmcap as a proxy for size suggests the small firm effect, as 
small firms tend to have greater reversals post event period in the two models. This result is 
consistent with the literature on the overreaction hypothesis e.g. Cox and Peterson (1994) and 
Farag and Cressy (2010).  
 
The results reported in Table 9 also show that the initial abnormal return on event day is 
negative in sign and significant in the two models. This suggests that price reversals are 
expected post limits hits.  This result is consistent with Cox and Peterson (1994). 
Interestingly, the leakage of information variable (Leak) is positive and significant for upper 
limit hits. This suggests that upper limit hits might be predictable pre event. This result 
implies the role of insider trading and information inefficiency in the Egyptian stock market. 
Finally, as expected, the dummy variable GFC is positive and significant within the lower 
limit hits reflecting the negative impact of the global financial crisis period.    
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Table 9: Cross Sectional Regressions 
 
 Upper hits Lower hits 
C 1.7719
**
 
(0.7581) 
1.9500
*
 
(1.0102) 
ARio -2.9834
**
 
(1.4622) 
-5.2833
**
 
(2.3474) 
SPL -0.3391
**
 
(0.1453) 
-0.3517
*
 
(0.1747) 
Lnmcap -0.1042
***
 
(0.0410) 
-0.0988
*
 
(0.0501) 
Leak 0.9480
**
 
(0.4172) 
-0.9608 
(0.8338) 
GFC 0.1581 
(0.2547) 
0.7459
**
 
(0.3591) 
R
2
 0.3204 0.3742 
F.stat 3.8202
***
 
(0.0059) 
4.6895
***
 
(0.0030) 
iCAAR
 is the cumulative average abnormal returns for company (i) over the event window 
(140 days). 
0iAAR = Average initial abnormal return for company (i) in event day t = 0. 
imcapln
 is the natural log of the free floated market cap of company (i) one day before 
the event. 
iLeak  is cumulative average abnormal returns for three days before event date 
as a proxy for the leakage of information. SPL is a dummy variable = 1 if the SPL regime 
is in operation and 0 otherwise. GFC: is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if 
the event occurs during 2007-2010 and 0 otherwise. The total number of non- 
overlapping events is 3542 events *, **, *** indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels. Robust standard errors are between parentheses. 
  
6.  Summary and conclusion 
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the influence of price limits on the 
overreaction hypothesis in the Egyptian stock market during the period 1999-2010. I find 
evidence of the overreaction anomaly in the EGX.  Price reversal is observed two and three 
days post lower and upper limit hits respectively within the SPL regime. However, price 
reversal occurs after one day only within the CB regime. These results support the the 
directional effect hypothesis of Brown and Harlow (1988); as large stock price movements 
are followed by price reversals in the opposite direction.  
 
Moreover, the results support the the magnitude effect hypothesis, as the larger the initial 
price movements the greater the subsequent reversals. Furthermore, the results support the 
small firm effect on the overreaction hypothesis for the lower limits within the SPL regime in 
particular. This can be explained in the light of the literature as volatility is more likely to be 
higher for small firms (Huang, 1997 and 1998). The results do not support the effect of firm 
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size on the overreaction hypothesis within the circuit breakers regimes. Finally, the main 
findings of the cross sectional regression show evidence that small firms tend to have greater 
reversals compared with large firms in the post event period. This result is consistent with the 
literature of the overreaction phenomenon e.g. Cox and Peterson (1994) and Farag and 
Cressy (2010). Moreover, the results support the overreaction hypothesis in the EGX and in 
particular the directional effect hypothesis of Brown and Harlow (1988).  
 
The paper provides clear evidence of stock market imperfection resulting from imposing 
different price limits regimes. Therefore investors can earn abnormal returns by exploiting 
the overreaction anomaly. Exploring market imperfections works as an early warning system 
to the regulator in emerging markets. Moreover, regulators may benefit from the study to 
identify the consequences and any potential market anomalies of imposing price limits 
regimes. 
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